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The changeful fate of a groundbreaking insight: the Darwinian fit-
ness principle caught in different webs of belief
Ulrich Krohs
Abstract
Darwin’s explanation of biological speciation in terms of variation and natural selection has
revolutionised biological thought. However, while his principle of natural selection, the fit-
ness principle, has shaped biology until the present, its interpretation changed more than
once during the almost 150 years of its history. The most striking change of the status of the
principle is that, in the middle of the 20th century, it transmutated from an often disputed,
groundbreaking insight into a tautology. Moreover, not only the interpretation of the fitness
principle, but the whole body of biological knowledge was subjected to significant modifi-
cations. In this paper, I relate modifications of the fitness principle to those of the respective
body of biological knowledge. This body of knowledge is conceived as a Quinean web of
belief. After an exposition of Darwin’s conception of the principle, which equated fitness
with adaptedness to the environment, several of its changes are analysed with respect to dif-
ferent webs of biological knowledge. It is concluded that the different interpretations and
the reshaping of the fitness principle are rational responses to the modified systems of back-
ground knowledge, which saved the coherence of the web of biological knowledge in each
single case.
Introduction
The evolutionary theories of Darwin and Wallace were the naturalists’ answer to
the question of the origin of species that was, until the 19th century, a domain for
religious ideas and myths. The idea of a phylogenetic evolution was already
around when these theories were developed, with, e. g., Erasmus Darwin and
Lamarck being important proponents of such views and many philosophers of the
enlightenment as supporters. However, before evolutionism could supersede the
idea of special creation, questions about the mechanisms and driving forces of the
evolutionary process had to be answered convincingly. Charles Darwin provided
an answer by proposing the following: that the change of species takes place by
natural selection of variant individuals, provided that the variation is inheritable to
some degree. According to Alfred Russel Wallace’s slightly different evolutionary
theory, not only individuals but also whole groups of individuals are subjected to
selection.1 I will be dealing only with Darwin’s version and some of its interpreta-
tions. Darwin’s contemporaries regarded the principle of selection or of the sur-
1  Charles Darwin, Alfred Russel Wallace, On the tendency of species to form varieties; and on the
perpetuation of varieties and species by natural means of selection, Journal of the Linnean
Society (Zool.) 3 (1858), p. 45, reprinted in: Charles Darwin, Alfred Russel Wallace, Evolution
by Natural Selection, Cambridge 1958.
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vival of the fittest as a groundbreaking insight that was worthy of discussion and
debate. But with the refinement of evolutionary theory, the principle was submitted
to an amazingly wide spectrum of different interpretations not all of which would
acknowledge that it had ever been disputed. In the course of the 20th century, it
turned from the accepted basis of modern biology into a mere tautology, bare of
any empirical content, and once more into an empirical claim that, despite its
former importance, turns out to be wrong unless it is modified. The unaltered ver-
sion, then, counted as belonging to an obsolete research program.
This changing interpretation is often regarded as a series that steps back and
forth between misinterpretation and correction. Nevertheless, all interpretations
turn out to be plausible in the context they belong to. Therefore, rather than judg-
ing some stages as correct and others as faulty, it is preferable to look for reasons
for the changes. Often, a reason for a change of the interpretation of a component
of a scientific theory can be found in the different bodies of knowledge to which it
is assimilated in different times: The structure of the body of biological knowledge
changes with time, and a changed structure may require embedding a component
of a theory, like the fitness principle, in a modified way into the system of knowl-
edge. Such a body of scientific knowledge is a web of belief in the Quinean sense.
By standards of science and rationality, such a web has to be coherent and, with
minor reservations, it also has to be consistent.2 “Coherence” means that the parts
of the body of knowledge do not fall apart and form unrelated “islands” of knowl-
edge, but that various relations hold instead, connecting beliefs that belong to dif-
ferent parts, so that the body of knowledge constitutes a system with
interdependent parts.3 Inconsistencies gradually diminish coherence. To enhance
coherence, a web of belief has to be adjusted by expelling contradictions and by
modifying parts of the web to increase the degree of interrelatedness. Scientific
culture is, in part, a culture of performing such adjustments in a controlled way,
e. g., on the occasion of the integration of new results.
In the following, I will analyse such adjustments of the web of biological
knowledge that involve a reinterpretation of the Darwinian selection principle, and
thereby try to shed some light on an important trait of scientific culture. To do this,
I will analyse several webs of belief that succeeded each other in the historical
development of biology. Nevertheless, I do not intend to give a history of Darwin-
ism here, on which excellent literature is easily available,4 but will confine myself to
certain prominent stages of the interpretation of Darwinism only. This selection
does not form a linear sequence in which each interpretation supplants the previous
2  Willard Van Orman Quine, Joseph S. Ullian, The Web of Belief,  2nd ed., New York 1978, esp.
pp. 42-53 and pp. 63-71. Accepting the notion of a web of belief entails accepting that the web
as a whole influences the status that a particular component of a theory has within the body of
knowledge in question. It does not entail the more demanding Duhem-Quine-thesis, which
states that no component of such a web may have validity conditions that are independent of
the web as a whole.
3  Paul Thagard, Chris Eliasmith, Paul Rusnock, Cameron P. Shelley, Knowledge and coherence,
in: Renée Elio (ed.), Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality Vol. 11, New°York 2002,
pp. 104-131.
The changeful fate of a groudbreaking insight 109
one, though more recent webs obviously rely on earlier ones: a web of knowledge
usually takes up certain components of older nets, but does not belong to the same
interpretative framework. Finally, I will draw my conclusion on the underlying
modus of change of biological knowledge.
I will reconstruct the different webs in a purely narrative way. This allows for a
straightforward access to different interpretations of the fitness principle. Techni
cal effort, in contrast, would be required for the reconstruction of the relations
between the different webs,5 which I will refrain from.
1. Fitness and adaptation:
Malthus’s law, Darwin’s insight, Spencer’s phrase
Darwin’s theory referred to the observation that not all individuals of the same bio-
logical species show the same morphology but that morphological variation occurs
and that many variations are inheritable. Less obvious was that selection is going
on in nature, and that natural selection could give rise to changes of species. Here,
Darwin could not allege to any direct evidence. Instead, he argued for this by refer-
ence to Malthus’s law as the basis of the mechanism of selection (as did Wallace).
This law states that the growth of population, showing exponential increase of the
number of individuals with time, quickly overruns any conceivable growth of
nutritional supply.6 In the long run, consequently, only a small fraction of individu-
als can survive to propagate. While Malthus was thinking of fairly stable popula-
tions as a consequence of the resulting “struggle for existence”, the idea of
inheritable variations opened up the possibility of another consequence. It seemed
striking to Darwin that, under the conditions of limited resources, the composition
4  E. g., Peter J. Bowler, Evolution. The History of an Idea, Berkeley, 2nd ed. 1989; David J.
Depew, Bruce H. Weber, Darwinism Evolving, Cambridge 1995; Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s
Struggle for Survival, Cambridge 1998. For the early development in German evolutionary
biology, cf. Emanuel Rádl, Geschichte der biologischen Theorien, Leipzig 1909; for the time
of the Modern Synthesis, cf. Wolf-Ernst Reif, Thomas Junker, Uwe Hoßfeld, The synthetic
theory of evolution: general problems and the German contribution to the synthesis, Theory in
Biosciences 119 (2000), pp. 41-91; Thomas Junker, Die zweite Darwinsche Revolution.
Geschichte des Synthetischen Darwinismus in Deutschland 1924 bis 1950, Marburg 2004;
Rainer Brömer, Uwe Hoßfeld, Nicolaas A. Rupke (eds.), Evolutionsbiologie von Darwin bis
heute, Berlin 2000, where also the Russian evolutionists are considered.
5  That mainly the reconstruction of theory relations asks for formal methods is shown in: Ulrich
Krohs, Wissenschaftstheoretische Rekonstruktionen, in: Ulrich Krohs, Georg Toepfer (eds.),
Philosophie der Biologie. Eine Einführung, Frankfurt/Main 2005, pp. 299-316; anyhow, a
simplified method is often sufficient to reconstruct biological theories: cf. Ulrich Krohs, Eine
Theorie biologischer Theorien: Status und Gehalt von Funktionsaussagen und informations-
theoretischen Modellen, Berlin 2004.
6  Thomas Robert Malthus, Essay on the Principle of Population, London 1798 (this 1st ed.
appeared anonymously). Malthus assumed a linear growth rate for the supply. As one of the
early critics, List has rejected this assumption: Friedrich List, Das nationale System der poli
tischen Ökonomie, Stuttgart 1841, p. 143. Nevertheless, it is clear that exponential population
growth would exhaust quickly even the resources of the whole universe.
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of the population will change over the generations: The survivors will constitute
neither a subset of individuals that represents the complete population, nor an arbi-
trary subset of individuals. Instead, there will be a biased selection: Survival
should, according to Darwin, depend on differences in the viability of the variants.
He regarded such differences in viability as a consequence of an unequally good fit
of different individuals into their environment. Survival, then, relies crucially on
the quality of this fit: the better the fit, the higher the probability for an individual
to survive and to propagate. Darwin called this the principle of natural selection.7
Herbert Spencer named this principle with the phrase “survival of the fittest”,
which he had already coined as an economic phrase before Darwin’s Origin was
published.8 Darwin used Spencer’s phrase, from the 5th edition of the Origin
onwards, synonymously with his original phrasing:
“I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the
term Natural Selection, in order to mark its relation to man’s power of selection. But the
expression often used by Mr Herbert Spencer of the Survival of the Fittest is more accurate,
and is sometimes equally convenient.”9
The use of the superlative “fittest” is obviously not to be taken literally, since not
only one species or one variety has survived. And nobody seems ever to have
claimed that Darwin meant that exclusively the one single organism with the high-
est fitness would survive. So I agree to the view that he was talking about a com-
parison of fitness only, and that only local comparison of organisms competing for
the same resources was meant.10 Talk about “the fittest”, even at the time when it
was introduced, has to be taken as a slogan that characterises the basic idea of nat-
ural selection without caring much about the details. Nevertheless, I shall claim in
the following section that things are different with respect to survival: that Darwin
did not conceive survival in terms of a comparatively higher survival rate.
While Spencer’s phrase was older than its application to biology, Darwin’s
explanation of the selection principle by reference to the fit between an organism
and its environment was older than his adoption of Spencer’s phrase, as I have
mentioned above. However, more important than the question by which phrase the
principle may be expressed most adequately is its intimate relation to the notion of
adaptation. The degree of fit refers to the notion of adaptation of an individual to
its environment. The latter point is crucial, since the explanation of the obvious
adaptation, e. g., of the giraffe to feeding on tall trees or of fishes to locomotion in
a liquid medium, was one of the key questions of 19th century biology. Adaptation
7  Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, London 1859, in:
Paul H. Barrett, R.B. Freeman (eds.), The Works of Charles Darwin Vol. 15, London 1988,
p.°80.
8  Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, London 1851.
9  Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, sixth edition, with additions
and corrections to 1872, London 1876, in: Paul H. Barrett, R. B. Freeman (eds.), The Works of
Charles Darwin Vol. 16, London 1988, p. 49.
10  Frédéric Bouchard, Alex Rosenberg, Fitness, probability and the principles of natural selec
tion, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2004), pp. 693-712.
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was often a door for teleological arguments for the existence of God. Darwin
rephrased the problem of being adapted in terms of a mere fit, which takes away
any teleological connotation the term “adaptation” may have. Now he could use
the term “adapted” synonymous to “fitting”, and he uses both in very similar con-
texts. In the first edition of the Origin, his argument relies on this transition:
“Let it be borne in mind how infinitely complex and close-fitting are the mutual relations of
all organic beings to each other and to their physical conditions of life.”11
Two pages later, Darwin takes up the relation of organisms to their environment,
now substituting “adapted” for “close-fitting”, when he points out that adaptation,
i.e., fit, is never found to be perfect:
“No country can be named in which all the native inhabitants are now so perfectly adapted to
each other and to the physical conditions under which they live, that none of them could
anyhow be improved”.12
Very much in this line of interpretation, Ariew and Lewontin write about Darwin-
ian fitness:
“The word ‘fit’ (‘fittest’, ‘fitness’) is a metaphorical extension of its everyday English mean-
ing as the degree to which an object (the organism) matches a pattern that is pre-existent and
independently determined (the environment).”13
2. Fitness and (human) fertility:
historical precursors of 20th century interpretations
Darwin borrowed a central idea that contributes to his selection principle from the
social sciences. Conversely, many biologists, mathematicians, and physicians were
ready to apply Darwin’s ideas to society.14 The so-called biometricians claimed to
do so.15 On the one hand (the mathematical one), their work was the first attempt
to quantify the parameters that Darwin had introduced. On the other hand (the
socio-political one), the biometricians developed eugenicist ideas that had fatal
impact on their Victorian society as well as on the politics of other countries, and
which were developed by their successors into the most cruel euthanasia program
11  Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, London 1859, in:
Paul H. Barrett, R.B. Freeman (eds.), The Works of Charles Darwin Vol. 15, London 1988,
p.°81 (my italics).
12  Ibid. pp. 82-83 (my italics). It should be observed that Darwin claims here explicitly that fit is
always non-optimal. In contrast to this, modern analyses of adaptation often rely on optimality
principles: cf. Steven Hecht Orzack, Elliott Sober (eds.), Optimality and Adaptationism, Cam
bridge 2000.
13  André Ariew, Richard C. Lewontin, The confusions of fitness, The British Journal for the Phi
losophy of Science 55 (2004), pp. 347-363, cf. p. 348.
14  Young goes a step further when claiming that biologists’ and sociologists’ writings were part
of a single debate: Robert M. Young, Malthus and the evolutionists: the common context of
biological and social theory, Past and Present 43 (1969), pp. 109-145.
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in Nazi Germany. That this fact cannot be deleted from the history of the reception
of Darwin’s work is now widely accepted. It is thoroughly analysed, e. g., in the
historic accounts of Darwinism that are referenced above in footnote no. 4. Relying
on these accounts, I will examine the change of the interpretation of the selection
principle within the programme of biometrics, and the dependence of the altered
interpretation on the different elements of the biometricians' web of belief. 15
Part of this web of belief was a cluster of offensive political ideas about social
welfare that was underpinned by meagre empirical data. The biometricians started
from demographic data and tried to analyse them in the light of Darwinian prince-
ples. These demographic data were read in a way that is chauvinist on different
levels at once. Gayon characterises the views of 19th century demographers as fol-
lows:16
“The poor, said the demographers, marry earlier and, being feckless, have a large number of
children. The ‘upper’ classes, on the other hand, being prudent and wishing to give their off-
spring the best possible education, limit their fertility.”
Such a view, though not necessarily the eugenicist idea that is based on it, is in
large part shared by Darwin himself, as chapter V of his Descent of Man witnesses.
There, besides the views of his nephew Galton, he gives the following quote from
Greg, to which he seems to agree:
“The careless, squalid, unaspiring Irishman multiplies like rabbits; the frugal, foreseeing,
self-respecting, ambitious Scot, stern in his morality, spiritual in his faith, sagacious and dis-
ciplined in his intelligence, passes his best years in struggle and celibacy, and leaves few
behind him”.17
For the biometricians, the consequence from such ‘data’ seemed to be twofold:
first, within each society there will be a proletarisation, meant, nota bene, as a pro-
cess of biological proliferation. And second, among different societies and “races”
the more “primitive” ones would outrun the more “noble” ones.18 Under this inter-
pretation, which Darwin judged as erroneous since it did not take into account
infant mortality,19 the data seemed to prove that evolution would change mankind
15  I will not follow the wider field of Social Darwinism, which makes use of a fitness concept
that has the connotations of strongness and efficiency and may be regarded as being based
mainly on Spencer’s rather than on Darwin’s writings. For references cf. Robert J. Richards,
Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior, Chicago 1987,
p. 5. Unfortunately, the most widespread German translation of the Origin by Carl W. Neu
mann (Leipzig 1921/Stuttgart 1963) gives, very much in line with these connotations, “Überle
ben des Tüchtigsten” for “survival of the fittest”, while some earlier translations (e. g., J. V.
Carus) have “Überleben des Passendsten”.
16  Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival, Cambridge 1998, p. 242.
17  Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man,  2nd ed., London 1877, in: Paul H. Barrett, R. B. Free
man (eds.), The Works of Charles Darwin Vol. 21, London 1989, p. 138.
18  The conceptualisation of ethnic groups as human “races” is not only politically dangerous, but
also untenable from the genetic point of view, cf. UNESCO Report, The race concept.
Results of an inquiry, Paris 1952; Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Genes, Peoples, and Languages,
New York 1999.
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for the worse. To block this tendency, eugenics was set up as a program of the
exclusion of people with politically unwanted traits, which were assumed to be
heritable, from having children. Since eugenics was meant to counteract a sup-
posed evolutionary process, it has to be classified as a breeding program rather
than as a Darwinian approach. 19
Nevertheless, biometry had Darwinian roots and I shall therefore analyse how
the meaning of the selection principle was changed so that it could be used as a ref-
erence of such a breeding program. The important Darwinian input was that Homo
sapiens, as any other species, is subject to evolutionary change. In his Descent of
Man, Darwin had explicitly extended the range of application of evolutionary the-
ory to humans. Since there may be fitness differences between human individuals,
natural selection may in principle influence the evolution of humankind. But Dar-
win’s selection principle did not predict the result that humankind will evolve for
the worse, of which the biometricians were afraid, since it did not refer to fertility,
the crucial aspect of their approach. In Darwin’s writing, survival meant the sur-
vival of an individual at least to the point of leaving offspring. Having in mind the
analogy with selection in breeding, he did not care about the role that differences in
fertility may have on the result of a selection process. He conceived the struggle
for existence as an all-or-nothing process of having success or having no success in
leaving progeny.
“If such [useful variations] do occur, can we doubt (remembering that many more individu
als are born than can possibly survive) that individuals having any advantage, however
slight, over others, would have the best chance of surviving and of procreating their kind?”20
So the advantage or surplus in fitness may be great or small. But Darwin conceives
surviving and procreating as an all-or-nothing process that happens with a certain
probability (“chance” and “probability” to be taken in a non-technical sense). This
means that the degree of fitness leads to a certain chance of survival rather then to
a certain grade of survival. So Darwin saw the effect of natural selection in making
the difference between survival and destruction. As he wrote in the famous letter to
Asa Gray from September 5th 1857:
“Only a few of those annually born can live to propagate their kind. What a trifling differ-
ence must often determine which shall survive, and which perish!”21
Nevertheless, the all-or-nothing result of individual survival contributes to the rela-
tive survival rates on the level of populations, and to fully account for these, fertil-
ity had to be included. But Darwin, in contrast to Wallace, was thinking in terms of
19  Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man,  2nd ed., London 1877, in: Paul H. Barrett, R. B. Free
man (eds.), The Works of Charles Darwin Vol. 21, London 1989, p. 138.
20  Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, sixth edition, with additions
and corrections to 1872, London 1876, in: Paul H. Barrett, R.B. Freeman (eds.), The Works of
Charles Darwin Vol. 16, London 1988, p. 63.
21  Cf. p. 265 of: Charles Darwin, Abstract of a letter to Professor Asa Gray (1857), in: Charles
Darwin, Alfred Russel Wallace, Evolution by Natural Selection, Cambridge 1958, pp. 264-
267.
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individuals as contributing to populations rather than in populations as wholes and
therefore could keep fertility out of his concept of fitness. Nevertheless, it has to be
acknowledged that Darwin’s thinking was not as simple as just presented. He
points out that
“of those which do survive, the best adapted individuals, supposing that there is any variabil-
ity in a favourable direction, will tend to propagate their kind in larger numbers than the less
well adapted.”22
He seems to have seen this as an effect that may in some cases affect the evolution-
ary process in addition to the survival-destruction-result of natural selection, not as
its basic mechanism.
The biometricians disagreed, and in 1877 Galton introduced productiveness in
leaving offspring as another factor that influences the survival rate, besides natural
selection and sexual selection that Darwin had identified.23 Consequently, Pearson
included reproductive selection, a supposed fitness-enhancing effect of high fertil-
ity, as a third component of fitness when he redefined the concept in the 1890s.24
Without such a redefinition, no consistency could have been achieved between the
offensive ideas about human society, wrong presuppositions about human biology,
and the Darwinian view of humankind as being involved in the evolutionary pro-
cess. It was a means to overcome Darwin’s dispassionateness with respect to the
future evolution of humankind without giving up any component of the biometri-
cians’ own web of belief, especially without giving up their interpretation of the
unreliable data on fertility.
However, the chauvinist and racist worldview as articulated by Greg in the
quote given above was not new and co-existed before its merger with Darwinism
with a Malthusian view on the struggle for existence. But why did the integration
of the new biological knowledge with these social ideas have such a horrible con-
sequence? In contrast to Darwin’s view, Malthus regarded the structure of the soci-
ety as fairly stable. Evolutionary theory suddenly seemed to pinpoint a possible
instability of the society: If evolution is going on, the biometricians concluded,
then only the fittest will survive and society will change. The fear was nourished
that the ‘higher class’ will be reduced in number and in the long run even be eradi-
cated. This fear could be rationalised by integrating a modified fitness principle
into the web of belief, a principle that allowed to delegate all supposed shortcom-
ings in the fitness of the upper class to the fertility component, without touching
the prejudice about other differences in quality between the classes.
22  Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, sixth edition, with additions
and corrections to 1872, London 1876, in: Paul H. Barrett, R.B. Freeman (eds.), The Works of
Charles Darwin Vol. 16, London 1988, p. 68.
23  Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival, Cambridge 1998, p. 245.
24  Ibid. pp. 245-246.
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3. Fitness and classical genetics:
steering through rough sea
With the beginning of the 20th century, Darwinism came in trouble for empirical
reasons. In 1900, Mendel’s work was rediscovered and integrated into the web of
biological knowledge. The new genetics, nowadays called “classical genetics”,
stated three rules about the inheritance of traits in sexually reproducing species.
The threat to Darwinism was that, according to Mendel’s results, variant traits may
become invisible in the first generation, and show up again only in the second gen-
eration of a crossing experiment. The consequence within the Darwinian frame-
work is that an organism that is better adapted than other members of its species
does not always produce offspring that has a similar fitness advantage. This find
ing was in contrast to Darwin’s assumption that variations are inherited as morpho-
logically visible traits.25 Mendel had shown that instead some factor that brings
about the modified trait, dubbed “gene” by Johannsen in 1909, may be silently
present in the offspring: It may give rise to the variant trait in the subsequent gen-
eration, when two silent carriers of the factor mate. So, initially, Mendelism was a
threat to Darwinism, and it was not at all clear how and whether at all both could
be made coherent.
Mendel discerned the genetic constitution of an organism from its physiologi-
cal constitution, the genotype from the phenotype (these, again, being Johannsen’s
terms). This distinction allowed substituting the concept of a genetic mutation for
that of a Darwinian variation. This contribution of Mendelism to evolutionary the-
ory can be regarded as the most important step of the integration of Darwinism and
population genetics in the synthetic theory of evolution, or the “modern synthesis”
as the new theoretical framework was baptised by Julian Huxley.26 The new
framework uncoupled to some extent the mutation of a gene and the modification
of the phenotype: Any particular gene may occur in different forms, called alleles.
Each cell has two copies of every gene, one from each parent, and in many cases a
phenotypic effect is seen only when both of the copies carry a mutation. In these
cases two genotypic carriers of a mutated allele of a gene have to mate before the
mutation has any phenotypic effect. However, it remained a mathematical task to
show whether the propagation of mutated alleles can in principle give rise to evolu-
25  For a Mendelian critique of Darwin’s blending theory see chap. 1 of: Ronald A. Fisher, The
Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, Oxford 1930. The last chapters of Fisher’s book show
that he, like many other geneticists of this time, was a strong eugenicist. Nevertheless, since
the eugenic background was made compatible with the fitness principle already by the biome
tricians, it did not seem to have much influence on the research program of the synthetic the
ory. The Nazis did not rely on evolutionism but overtly claimed their own values that they
ascribed to or denied humans (“lebensunwertes Leben”) and used these as well as overt racism
as a justification of what they intended to do. They even purged the works of Darwinists from
the libraries, see p. 234 of: Diane B. Paul, Darwin, social Darwinism and eugenics, in:
Jonathan Hodge, Gregory Radick (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Darwin, Cambridge
2003, pp. 214-239. For reference to historical analyses of the relationship of German biolo
gists to Nazi ideology, see footnote 51 below.
26  Julian S. Huxley, Evolution: The Modern Synthesis, London 1942.
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tionary processes. Even if Darwin should have known about Mendel’s work, an
issue that is not settled, he would hardly have been able to tackle the mathematical
problem. Only in the 1920s did population geneticists have reason to claim that the
question has to be answered in favour of genetics being the basis for evolution. But
this synthesis required another adjustment of the notion of fitness.
Population genetics describes the distribution of alleles in a population in a
quantitative way. Only basic statistical and combinatorial methods are needed to
deduce some basic rules of allele distribution, like the Hardy-Weinberg law.27 But
as long as such equations do not refer to natural selection, they do not describe
Darwinian selection. At this level, Mendelism and Darwinism still were two inde-
pendent bodies of knowledge. They were mutually compatible, but isolated, and
therefore cannot be regarded as constituting one coherent web of belief. Introduc-
ing the notion of fitness into population genetic equations bridged the gap between
both fields. This was done in the 1920s by Ronald A. Fisher, Sewall Wright, and J.
B. S. Haldane. The way this integration was achieved may be regarded as a two-
step process: The population genetical equations dealt with genotypes only. So the
first step was to assign fitness no longer to the phenotype, but to the genotype. This
was plausible because the genotype was thought to determine the phenotype com-
pletely. (The nature-nurture and other debates challenged this view later on.) And
since Mendel had shown that genes for different traits are inherited independently
(segregation rule), it seemed to be plausible to deal not only with the fitness of
whole genotypes, but to assign to each allele a share of the fitness value by which it
contributes to the overall fitness of an organism. These shares were regarded as
being additive (which was an educated guess at best, in analogy to the segregation
rule).28
In addition to this first step, a measure for fitness was needed. The second step
established such a measure, which could easily be gained from the selection prince-
ple. According to this principle, the fitter will survive; the less fit will die before it
can reproduce. So fitness may be estimated by survival rates. How are these rates
to be determined? The biometrician’s legacy was to include a fertility component
into the survival rate. Therefore, evolution-relevant survival can be measured by
counting the number of offspring. Accordingly, the number of offspring that an
individual leaves under given conditions is an estimate of its fitness under these
conditions. By comparison of the fitness of individuals differing in the allele of one
gene only, relative fitness values can be ascribed to each allele, as required. Sur-
vival data may now be used to ascribe fitness-contributions of single genes that are
under comparative investigation. Fitness, initially being a synonym for adapted
ness of an organism, became an additive property of the alleles a genotype consists
of.
By this move, the notion of fitness was reshaped to integrate genetics and Dar-
winism into one single coherent web of knowledge. The argument leading to the
27  See, e. g., Elliott Sober, The Nature of Selection, Chicago 1984, pp. 32-38.
28  Ibid. pp. 179-178; cf. Ronald A. Fisher, The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, Oxford
1930.
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redefinition is perfectly sound within the framework of the modern synthesis. The
empirical content of the equations includes, e. g., the prediction that fitness values
of the alleles of any particular gene are independent from the genetic context, and
that they are additive. However, the next two sections of my paper will deal with
problems that arise as to the empirical content of the principle when the web of
belief changes, or when the argument is read, beyond its scope, as a proof of Dar-
winism.
4.  The fitness principle and general knowledge:
a strange consequence of canonisation
By the middle of the 20th century, Darwinism as it was shaped by the synthetic the-
ory had made its way into general knowledge. However, what was taken up by
general knowledge was a digest of evolutionary theory only, focused around the
mechanism of mutation and selection and the phrase of the survival of the fittest. In
particular, it seems to have been part of general knowledge that fitness was mea-
sured by survival rates. At least, that is what can be found in accounts of Darwin-
ism that were given by intellectuals of that time, most prominently by Karl Popper.
It certainly does some injustice to Popper to concede only general knowledge of
Darwinism to him, and for sure he studied the literature more carefully than many
others may have done. But as he was neither directly involved in evolutionary
research nor did count himself among the specialists in biological topics,29 I hope
one will forgive me classifying Sir Karl like this. Anyhow, it shall not be con
cealed that Popper later on recanted the objection against Darwinism that this sec-
tion of my paper will deal with.30
The eclectic integration of only some aspects of Darwinism into the web of
general knowledge entailed another reinterpretation of the fitness principle; a rein-
terpretation biology still has to deal with. It resulted in an objection against Dar-
winism that is historically most astonishing: While Darwin’s theory was hardly
compatible with the web of belief of many of his contemporaries,31 100 years later
it has not only been conceded that it gives the correct account of natural history,
but that this account is even obviously true and that Darwinism collapses into a
mere tautology. The tautology argument runs as follows: (i) Darwinism claims that
only the fittest will survive; (ii) fitness equals the survival rate of the offspring; (iii)
substituting (ii) into (i) turns (i) roughly into the claim that the survivor will sur-
vive. Consequently, the objection is raised that Darwinism is based on a mere tau-
tology and therefore is empirically empty. (The premises, however, do not do
justice to Darwinism, see below.)
29  Karl R. Popper, Natural selection and the emergence of mind, Dialectica 22 (1978), pp. 339-
355. Excerpts are reprinted as: Natural selection and its scientific status, in: David Miller (ed.),
A Pocket Popper, London 1983, pp. 239-246.
30  Ibid.
31  Things are similar with the web of belief of present-day creationists, who are unable to inte
grate evolutionary theory into their belief in the translation of the bible they grew up with.
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Popper, though he was a little bit more cautious and wrote about Darwinism as
“almost tautological” only, held this view at least until 1974.32 And though many
biologists and philosophers of biology disputed this view,33 he felt in company
even with Darwinists in holding the tautology-view.34 In Popper’s thinking, Dar-
winism as an almost tautological theory had to be classified as a metaphysical
research programme rather than as a theory with empirical content. He conceived
Darwinism as an “applied situational logic”.35 This classification acknowledges
that the realm of life on earth has arisen contingently. But given that the realm of
biological objects is structured as it empirically has turned out, all propositions of
evolutionary theory followed just from applying logical principles to the descrip-
tion of biological reality. So Popper accepted that evolutionary theory is based on
empirical data, but denied that it can yield other propositions about this field than
truisms. It should be noticed that this need not be regarded as an objection to Dar-
winism. Reconstructing a scientific theory as an applied logic was exactly what
Carnap, in a sense an antagonist of Popper’s, aimed for. He reconstructed scientific
theories as axiomatic systems. According to him, theories are based on the defini-
tion of a number of concepts and their relations in the set of axioms expressed in
the language of predicate logic. The theory itself then becomes an applied logic.
And this in no way hinders that theorems of the system might conflict with empiri-
cal data, showing need to modify the axiomatic basis of the system.36 Since the
applicability of a theory to a range of phenomena is a matter of empirical ade
quacy, a scientific theory may be tautological without being an empirically empty
metaphysical research programme for this reason.
Many critics who understood the fitness principle tautologically were less con-
cerned about giving a philosophically interesting reconstruction than Popper was,
and claimed that Darwinism is scientifically useless in the end. Again, this was
done mostly by non-specialists and therefore may be regarded as a view based on
the deprived version of Darwinism that entered general knowledge.37 This criti
32  Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford 1972; Karl R. Pop
per, Darwinism as a metaphysical research programme, in: Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philoso
phy of Karl Popper Vol. I, La Salle 1974, pp. 133-143.
33  For reviews of the dispute, see Costas B. Krimbas, In defense of Neo-Darwinism: Popper’s
“Darwinism as a metaphysical research programme” revisited, in: Rama S. Singh, Costas B.
Krimbas, Diane B. Paul, John Beatty (eds.), Thinking About Evolution: Historical, Philosoph
ical, and Political Perspectives, Cambridge 2001, pp. 292-308, and Richmond Campbell,
Jason Scott Robert, The structure of evolution by natural selection, Biology and Philosophy 20
(2005), pp. 673-696.
34  Karl R. Popper, Natural selection and the emergence of mind, Dialectica 22 (1978), pp. 339-
355. Excerpts are reprinted as: Natural selection and its scientific status, in: David Miller (ed.),
A Pocket Popper, London 1983, pp. 239-246.
35  Cf. pp. 134-135 of: Karl R. Popper, Darwinism as a metaphysical research programme, in:
Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper Vol. I, La Salle 1974, pp. 133-143.
36  Rudolf Carnap, Einführung in die symbolische Logik, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer
Anwendungen, Wien 1954; engl. ed. New York 1958; cf. Ulrich Krohs, Wissenschaftstheore
tische Rekonstruktionen, in: Ulrich Krohs, Georg Toepfer (eds.), Philosophie der Biologie.
Eine Einführung, Frankfurt/Main 2005, pp. 299-316.
37  Cf. the examples given by Elliott Sober, The Nature of Selection, Chicago 1984, p. 61.
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cism is justified within the body of general knowledge as it was extracted from
Popper’s writings, involving a deprived version of Darwinism only, as long as the
applicability of the basic concepts of Darwinism is not questioned. Nonetheless,
this criticism clearly misunderstands Fisher’s account of fitness in terms of sur
vival. The equation that relates fitness and survival was never meant to be a defini-
tion of fitness, it should help to measure it. As I have reviewed in the last section,
Fisher did not define fitness by survival, but used survival as an estimate of fit-
ness.
38
 It is not astonishing at all that the estimate of fitness that relies on the selec-
tion principle cannot give an independent proof of the principle. It is useless to
overstress the Fisher equation in this way. The equation shows merely how fitness
adds up from contributions of particular genes (and needs to make grossly simpli-
fying assumptions to yield this result). Since the web of general knowledge neither
integrates the rationale of Fisher’s definition nor acknowledges that fitness was ini-
tially defined as adaptedness, it becomes coherent upon the tautological interpreta-
tion of the fitness principle.
However, Popper’s way out was more elegant and in fact gave an important
push to the debate, which lasts to the present. He defined fitness as the propensity
to leave offspring instead of equating fitness with the actual survival rate or the
probability to survive.39 Propensity and probability differ conceptually and the
average survival rate may differ from the one to be expected from a certain propen-
sity. Therefore, this definition escapes any suspicion of having a tautological struc-
ture.
5. Fitness and the renunciation of adaptationism:
the fruitful political incorrectness
In the preceding section, we have seen how an oversimplification of Darwinism has
lead to a reinterpretation of the fitness principle as a mere tautology. The tau
tology occurred when the survival rate, being used as an estimate for fitness, is
mistaken as its definition. Pointing at this shortcoming, however, leaves unan-
swered the question for a proper definition of fitness as it comes up within biology.
The issue is not yet settled and my task will not be to enter the ongoing discussion
about a formally correct definition, to which I will give some clues only. Most of
these definitions refer to ones belonging to older webs of belief, but more interest-
ing in the present context are the modifications they show. These are due to the
modified theoretical background. I will therefore discuss in the present section the
modified theoretical background that demanded, from 1979 on, a new definition of
fitness to adapt the concept to the changed web of biological knowledge.
In 1979, Steven J. Gould and Richard Lewontin published their seminal paper
with the flowery title “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Para-
38  The status of being an estimate rather than a definition is stressed by Sober, ibid. p. 43.
39  Karl R. Popper, Darwinism as a metaphysical research programme, in: Paul A. Schilpp (ed.),
The Philosophy of Karl Popper Vol. I, La Salle 1974, pp. 133-143.
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digm.”40 They blamed the received view of Darwinian evolution, which saw an
adaptation in each and every trait of a biological organism, for missing the goal to
explain evolutionary history. All too often, instead of giving an explanation, Dar-
winists were contented with a demonstration of the mere compatibility of the fossil
record and of the structure of recent organisms with the theory of evolution. Since
it was regarded as impossible to close all the gaps that the fossil record leaves open
with respect to the phylogenetic processes, this seemed all that could be achieved.
Being content with the possible, many biologists merely aimed for showing that
there might have been a plausible evolutionary way that in principle could have
resulted in what can be observed, to tell an “adaptive story”. The best-known
example of such a story is Darwin’s account of the possible evolution of the eye.41
Gould and Lewontin pointed out that such adaptationist stories, by referring exclu-
sively to the external conditions an organism is subjected to, ignored most impor-
tant constraints of internal organisation and of historically contingent organismic
structures. These constraints not only restrict evolvability, at the same time they
may direct evolutionary processes as much as adaptational demands do. Therefore,
adaptive stories that should make plausible the evolution of a trait may in many
cases be grossly faulty. Such stories were accused of in fact explaining nothing –
not because adaptationism42 was trivially true as the tautology-objection suggests,
but because trivially any trait could be explained in some way as being adaptive,
independent of whether this explanation is historically correct or not and even
whether the trait is adaptive at all. Gould and Lewontin argued that the organi-
sation of an organism is as dependent on inner constraints as on adaptation to the
non-living and to the living environment. And the constraints influenced survival
as much as the degree of adaptation to the environment.
This view has roots, e. g., in theories of morphological self-organisation, but
also in the ‘neutral theory’ of evolution.43 It does not deny that adaptation plays a
major role in evolution, but it demands an account of what actually occurred
instead of story telling, explanation instead of sketches of what might have been
possible. If nevertheless the notion of the survival of the fittest should be retained
as an evolutionary principle, the informal Darwinian definition of fitness as well as
40  Stephen J. Gould, Richard C. Lewontin, The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian par
adigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme, Proceedings of the Royal Society London B
205 (1979), pp. 581-598.
41  Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, London 1859, in:
Paul H. Barrett, R.B. Freeman (eds.), The Works of Charles Darwin Vol. 15, London 1988,
chap. VI.
42  It is an oversimplification to speak of “the” adaptationism as I do here for the sake of conve
nience. Godfrey-Smith discerns different levels of adaptationism, cf. Peter Godfrey-Smith,
Three kinds of adaptationism, in: Steven Hecht Orzack, Elliott Sober (eds.), Optimality and
Adaptationism, Cambridge 2000, pp. 335-357.
43  Cf. D’Arcy W. Thompson, On Growth and Form (1917/42), Cambridge 1961; Motoo Kimura,
The Neutral Theory of Evolution, Cambridge 1983. A predecessor of the neutral theory is
Wagner’s migration theory. Here, the sampling error that occurs upon the splitting of a popula
tion replaces Darwinian selection as the determinant of which variations survive: Moritz Wag
ner, Die Entstehung der Arten durch räumliche Sonderung, Basel 1889.
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the geneticists’ refinements had lost their validity. In the light of the new theoretic-
cal approach, these old definitions decoupled biological theory from the historical
facts. A decoupling of the different components of a body of knowledge decreases
its coherence, since high coherence requires a strong interdependence of the com-
ponents of the set of beliefs.44 So integration of knowledge about constraints as
evolutionary factors caused a decrease of the coherence of the body of biological
knowledge. If Darwinism should not completely be expelled from this web, the
concept of fitness needed to be redefined to increase coherence of the web of
belief. Usually, the original tautology objection and the triviality objection just
mentioned are not regarded separately by the defenders of the fitness principle, so
their attempts to overcome a tautological structure may be regarded as defending
an adaptationist view against both objections at once.
The most common re-integration into the web of biological knowledge fol-
lowed Popper’s propensity view as mentioned in the last section. This view is not
committed to the adaptationist programme and may include a component that is
due to constraints. Nevertheless, most approaches put forward versions of the fit-
ness principle that do not explicitly refer to constraints. Some authors return to fit-
ness as adaptedness, proposing ways to avoid a tautological structure of the
definition and to find a measure for this kind of fitness,45 while others want to
abandon ecological fitness altogether.46 While some approaches discern different
notions of fitness that have to be kept separate,47 others see the need to combine
different aspects within one single concept of fitness.48 As I have promised, I will
not go into detail. I wanted to show merely that the change of the web of biological
knowledge that was induced by the renunciation of adaptationism entailed another
need for a redefinition of the concept of fitness. This new discussion about the
proper definition of fitness has emerged mainly among philosophers of biology.
Notwithstanding the challenge to find a definition that is theoretically satisfying,
44  Paul Thagard, Chris Eliasmith, Paul Rusnock, Cameron P. Shelley, Knowledge and coherence,
in: Renée Elio (ed.), Common sense, reasoning, and rationality Vol. 11, New York 2002,
pp. 104-131.
45  Frédéric Bouchard, Alex Rosenberg, Fitness, probability and the principles of natural selec
tion, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2004), pp. 693-712.; Alex Rosen
berg, Frederic Bouchard, Matthen and Ariew’s obituary for fitness: reports of its death have
been greatly exaggerated, Biology and Philosophy 20 (2005), pp. 343-353; Richmond Camp
bell, Jason Scott Robert, The structure of evolution by natural selection, Biology and Philoso
phy 20 (2005), pp. 673-696.
46  Mohan Matthen, André Ariew, Two ways of thinking about fitness and natural selection, The
Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002), pp. 55-83; Mohan Matthen, André Ariew, How to under
stand casual relations in natural selection: Reply to Rosenberg and Bouchard, Biology and
Philosophy 20 (2005), pp. 355-364.
47  André Ariew, Richard C. Lewontin, The confusions of fitness, The British Journal for the Phi
losophy of Science 55 (2004), pp. 347-363; Cf. pp. 699-700 of: Frédéric Bouchard, Alex
Rosenberg, Fitness, probability and the principles of natural selection, The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 55 (2004), pp. 693-712.
48  Elliott Sober, The two faces of fitness, in: Rama S. Singh, Costas B. Krimbas, Diane B. Paul,
John Beatty (eds.), Thinking About Evolution: Historical, Philosophical, and Political Per
spectives Vol. 2, Cambridge 2001, pp. 309-321;
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biologists are using operational definitions that satisfy the requirements of local
arguments, e. g., based on hatching rates or even on mating numbers. By such def-
initions, the local coherence of a section of the web of belief is increased, which
allows circumventing the remaining problems with the intimately related larger
issue of the global concept of fitness.
6. Conclusion: How webs of belief are adjusted
The different interpretations and the reshaping of the fitness principle that occurred
during the last century were reconstructed in the preceding sections as rational
responses to the modified systems of background knowledge, which saved the
coherence of the web of biological knowledge in each single case. In the first
example, the eugenicist web of belief of the Victorian biometricians, the most
important uptake of a fertility component into the selection principle was not suffi-
ciently motivated by empirical results. Instead, it increased the coherence of the
biometricians’ web of belief by linking their biological and their socio-political
beliefs. The next example, the web of belief of the population geneticists, initially
showed inconsistencies between its Mendelist and its Darwinist components. This
required not only a reinterpretation of the Darwinian concept of variation in terms
of mutations; it demanded as well the division of fitness into contributions of indi-
vidual alleles to overall genotype fitness. Third, the web of general biological
knowledge in the mid-20th century embraced a deprived version of Darwinism.
This gave rise to the tautology interpretation of the fitness principle and conse-
quently to a critique of the synthetic theory, which increased the coherence of the
web of belief, though it made Darwinism fairly uninteresting. And, finally, the
renunciation of the research programme of adaptationism caused a decrease of the
coherence of the web of biological knowledge that initiated a new debate on the
issue. Several of the different recent approaches attempt to overcome the loss of
coherence by specification and redefinition of the concept of fitness, thereby trying
to re-establish adaptationism in a way that escapes the criticism, or by expelling
the concept of fitness completely.
This survey shows that the fitness principle was not stable with respect to
changes of the embedding context. Gayon stresses the context dependence even of
the acceptability of the original Darwinian hypothesis:
“Today’s Darwinism was indeed founded by Darwin, but the theoretical and experimental
context of the Darwinian hypothesis had to be utterly changed for it to become even plausi-
ble.”49
The theoretical and experimental context Gayon talks about has to be conceived
rather widely, as a whole web of biological knowledge and often even embracing
non-biological beliefs. Anyhow, his statement has to be supplemented by the
observation that not only has the context of the Darwinian hypothesis changed; the
49  Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival, Cambridge 1998, p. 398.
The changeful fate of a groudbreaking insight 123
hypothesis itself has changed as well—which happened partly in response to mod-
ifications of the context it was embedded into. Such context sensitivity has often
raised the question whether internal or external explanations hold, whether the
changes of a scientific theory were introduced for scientists’ own rational reasons,
or as effects of the conditions science was subjected to in different times. To refer
to the increase of coherence of a web of belief by rational reasons as an explanation
of scientific change does in a way commit to the internalist view. It is the web of a
scientists’ own beliefs that requires rational changes of some of its elements. On
the other hand, a web of belief may involve significant non-biological components,
including socio-political beliefs, and it is not private, but shared by a scientific
community. Therefore, the approach that I have followed seems to involve some
commitment to externalist explanations of theory dynamics as well. This may
appear to be problematic: David Hull, e. g., has recently criticised the externalist
explanation that attributes the competitive approach of Darwin’s evolutionary the-
ory to the Victorian society and own social status,50 and I completely agree with
his view. Pointing out that the development of the conceptions of fitness in differ-
ent countries paralleled each other, under completely different socio-political con-
ditions, might even strengthen the critique: The views of the German biologists
Wilhelm Ludwig and Nikolai Timoféeff-Ressovsky in the 1930s were very close
to those of Fisher, Wright, and Haldane, though they worked in Nazi-Germany,
under politically and socially completely different conditions than those holding
for their British and American colleagues.51 Anyhow, since there is no doubt that
different causes may have similar or even identical effects, such a comparison can-
not prove external explanation wrong. A proof against external explanations would
need to demonstrate instead that identical external causes give rise to different
results, but this can hardly ever be achieved. So a strict refutation of any relevance
of external explanations will not be possible. However, the view of a complete dis-
junction of explanation by external causes or internal reasons seems to be simplis
tic anyway.52 The analysis based on webs of belief allows for a more differentiated
view. Though a coherentist approach puts forward an internalist explanation, it is
50  David L. Hull, Deconstructing Darwin: evolutionary theory in context, Journal of the History
of Biology 38 (2005), pp. 137-152.
51  Some recent work reconstructs the situation of the Modern Synthesis in Germany: Thomas
Junker, Die zweite Darwinsche Revolution. Geschichte des Synthetischen Darwinismus in
Deutschland 1924 bis 1950, Marburg 2004, pp. 306-328. Nevertheless, many German Biolo
gists strongly supported the Nazi ideology, cf. Thomas Junker, Uwe Hoßfeld, The architects of
the evolutionary synthesis in national socialist Germany: science and politics, Biology and
Philosophy 17 (2002), pp. 223–249; Uwe Hoßfeld, Staatsbiologie, Rassenkunde und Moderne
Synthese in Deutschland während der NS-Zeit, in: Rainer Brömer, Uwe Hoßfeld, Nicolaas A.
Rupke (eds.), Evolutionsbiologie von Darwin bis heute, Berlin 2000, pp. 249–305; Thomas
Junker, Synthetische Theorie, Eugenik und NS-Biologie, in: Rainer Brömer, Uwe Hoßfeld,
Nicolaas A. Rupke (eds.), Evolutionsbiologie von Darwin bis heute, Berlin 2000, pp. 307–360.
52  This was pointed out several times with respect to the development of Darwinism, e. g., Robert
M. Young, Malthus and the evolutionists: the common context of biological and social theory,
Past and Present 43 (1969), pp. 109-145; David L. Hull, Deconstructing Darwin: evolutionary
theory in context, Journal of the History of Biology 38 (2005), pp. 137-152.
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not committed to rejecting external influence altogether. It accounts for the influ-
ence of external factors on theory formation indirectly, in so far as they are
reflected in socio-political and biological beliefs of an individual or of a scientific
community.
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